After reading and analyzing the given articles, I believe that technologically-orientated companies should not weaken encryption or implement backdoors for the express purpose of government surveillance alone. I do believe that companies should allow the government to examine a singular, specific device during criminal investigations; for example, I believe that the government was right in trying to procure the San Bernardino shooters’ phone or should be allowed to view records of, as they mentioned countless times throughout articles, a person involved in child pornography. If a search warrant is properly secured, then the government should be given access to that singular device’s contents, for searching through a phone is roughly equivalent to examining other personal items, such a diary, which could contain evidence useful for a conviction.
Smaller cases aside, government surveillance on a massive, generic scale, such as maintaining a database of driver’s licenses and secretly asking Google, Yahoo, and Facebook for browser history and other information, is an invasion of privacy. Accessing this data without any suspicion of criminal activity is unwarranted and would be unnecessary additional work for the computer scientists involved. In all of the gathered data, the likelihood of detecting criminal behavior given the data collected would be relatively small and could easily lead to a misidentification or biased assumptions that could, in turn, cause false accusations or arrests. Therefore, I believe that while government intrusion of someone’s “private information” would be acceptable in the context of a completed criminal act, mass surveillance to maybe catch a criminal is unnecessary and frightening.
There is a strong counter-argument to this argument, however, and that is that if someone broke the encryption on a phone in for one specific instance, then this person should continue to use this encryption program to its fullest potential and as a source of leverage. This is exactly what the FBI did when they jailbroke an iPhone; because of their success, the FBI expanded their jurisdiction by requesting the ability to make overseas warrants to remotely hack and collecting more personal information from companies, including account numbers and login information. In my opinion, this is definitely a violation of privacy, and if such successes continue, government officials could continue to demand more and more information, causing this problem to snowball out of control.
To prevent this mass surveillance, an extremely strict set of checks and balances could be enforced between both providers and the FBI concerning encryption and information distribution. Going behind Apple’s back to retrieve information from the San Bernardino shooters’ phones was wrong; the FBI abused the methods to retrieve information by continuing to expand and push further surveillance. Overall, both parties involved must be cautious and conscientious of the information they are handling and the powers they use to access such information.
Considering just the tech companies’ roles in this relationship, I believe that they must protect privacy while also, when possible, aiding the government in their investigations. When buying a phone or other device, the consumer trusts their personal device and its makers to a certain degree, agreeing to use it on the grounds that texts are private and their information is kept safe. Therefore, in regular, day-to-day circumstances, companies are obligated to provide this form of privacy. However, when crimes occur and search warrants are produced, tech companies should comply with the law if the device contains legitimate evidence or information crucial to solve a crime.
This approach of allowing limited investigations, I believe, does at least an acceptable job at balancing free-flowing information and extreme terrorism. There is probably a better method of approaching this precarious situation, for my method does not actively “prevent” terrorist or criminal activities from happening in the first place. However, if the government starts to accuse people for crimes that, at one time, they may have considered but decided against doing, then that would inherently wrong. At the same time, though, preventing injuries from ever occurring would be amazing. To once again push back on that point, texts and metadata are not always indicative of final behavior. Based on this paragraph alone, I believe there is no absolute way to balance freedom with absolute security, but through limited investigations, the government and tech companies can take a step in the right direction to promote these two concepts equally.
As I have stated before, one of the flaws in my “plan” is that I do not provide any assurance or way that crimes can be preemptively prevented. This is because if government surveillance becomes too all-encompassing and invasive, the terrorists and those who wish to commit crimes would find a way to do it even without the internet or tech companies’ devices. If such mass censoring were to occur, fear and distrust would grow in citizens’ hearts, and those with malicious intent would be even more encouraged to operate in even more subtle, undetected ways. By telling society that if they have nothing to hide, they have nothing to fear, the government would also continue to cultivate the fear of an official falsely interpreting posts and actions, deciding that a person is hiding something, and then taking appropriate measures to eliminate the threat. In the end, the government would make society more dangerous as terrorists are pushed out of the more public channels out of fear and into places where evidence on them would be even harder to collect.